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Abstract
Using panel data on the full population of corporate tax returns of Armenian firms,
we study the behavioral response of firms to three size-dependent regulations. We
find: i) a strong response to an accounting notch where International Financial Re-
porting Standards become mandatory; ii) a moderate response to an administrative
notch below which the frequency of filing and paying taxes declines from monthly
to quarterly; and iii) no response to a tax notch created by the registration thresh-
old of the value added tax. Exploiting tax audits, we provide evidence suggesting
that income under-reporting drives the bunching response of firms by between 60
and 100 percent. Additional evidence suggests that firms respond to tax audits by
compensating every additional dollar of audit driven increase in reported income
by a 0.7-0.8 dollar increase in reported deductions.
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1 Introduction
In many developing countries inadequate tax capacities and low tax revenues represent
one of the main obstacles to economic development (Besley and Persson 2013, 2014).
Following the seminal work of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) the traditional theoretical
literature on taxation mainly focuses on the optimal design of tax schedules without
paying much attention to various issues related to the tax system as a whole, including tax
administration and tax compliance, among others (Slemrod and Gillitzer 2013). While
more recent applied research has made important advancements also in the fields of tax
administration and tax compliance, particularly owing to the availability of administrative
micro datasets and field experiments, the evidence from developing countries remains
fairly limited (for surveys see, e.g., Slemrod and Yitzhaki. 2002, Fuest and Zodrow
2013). However, inefficient tax administration and high rates of tax evasion may arguably
play a more important role in developing countries, since by limiting the capacity of the
state these may have further adverse effects on economic development. On the other
hand, in order to design a fair and efficient tax system, policymakers need to have credible
empirical evidence on the behavioral impacts of the tax system as a whole (Saez, Slemrod,
and Giertz 2012).
Our paper aims at contributing to this debate by studying whether and how firms –
and particularly smaller firms – in a developing country respond to different incentives
created by tax, administrative and accounting rules and policies. We study the behav-
ioral responses of firms to these three sets of policies one-by-one and in a comparative
setting, and then show the mechanisms behind the response. The three policies that we
study are: i) a tax notch created by the value added tax (VAT) registration threshold;
ii) an administrative notch below which the frequency of filing and paying both VAT
and corporate income taxes is quarterly instead of monthly for smaller firms; and iii)
an accounting notch where International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) become
mandatory and replace simplified tax accounting rules for small and medium enterprises
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(SME). These regulations that depend on the level of firms’ income often play an im-
portant role in policy debates because they are one of the central policy instruments in
favoring SMEs. However, such size-dependent thresholds where the policy discontinuity
is particularly large may also generate incentives for firms, for example, to stay small,
thus creating incentives inhibiting firm growth and productivity.
We use the bunching method1 and exploit administrative panel data on the universe of
corporate tax returns of Armenian firms over the 2007-13 period. A unique feature of the
Armenian data is the availability of information on tax audits. Exploiting this data allows
shedding light on the mechanisms behind bunching behavior by studying how much of the
observed response is due to tax non-compliance. Besides this, Armenia is an interesting
developing country to study firms’ responses to taxation and tax administration because
of its current situation characterized by potentially high rates of tax non-compliance
possibly created by weak tax administration.2
We make three contributions to the recent and growing literature on firm response to
taxes in developing countries.3 First, we extend the literature on firm response to VAT
registration thresholds to developing countries.4 Recent studies by Onji (2009) for Japan,
Harju, Matikka, and Rauhanen (2015) for Finland and Liu and Lockwood (2015) for the
1Saez (2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013) introduce bunching at kinks and notches respectively.
See, e.g., Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011), Le Maire and Schjerning (2013), Bastani and
Selin (2014) for applications of this method in the context of personal income taxation and Devereux, Liu,
, and Loretz (2014), Best, Brockmeyer, Kleven, Spinnewijn, and Waseem (2015) for corporate taxation.
Kleven (2016) provides a review of the method and the literature. Additionally, Slemrod (2013) discusses
the different types of tax notches and estimation of structural parameters using such notches.
2The tax administration in Armenia is ranked quite low by international comparisons (such as by the
Doing Business report, see more in Section 2), while the shadow economy is said to comprise as much
as half of the official economy (see, e.g., International Finance Corporation 2011). Such inefficiencies
may seriously impede growth rates, for example, by generating significant costs for business development
and economic competitiveness. They are also likely to undermine revenue-raising powers of the central
government, thus adversely affecting public finances.
3Among others, see Kleven and Waseem (2013), Best et al. (2015) on Pakistan, Carrillo, Emran, and
Anita (2012), Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2016) on Ecuador, Bachas and Soto (2015) on Costa Rica,
Pomeranz (2015) on Chile, Boonzaaier, Harju, Matikka, and Pirttila¨ (2016) on South Africa, Gebresilasse
and Sow (2016) on Ethiopia.
4We observe that by now the setting of a registration threshold is a rather universal feature of many
VAT systems (see, Table A1 of the appendix for VAT thresholds around the world in 2013). Firms
with turnovers above this threshold are required to register and collect the tax, and receive the right of
claiming back the tax on their inputs. On the other hand, small firms falling below the threshold that
do not register may save considerably on costs related to collecting and remitting the VAT, while the tax
authority may save on the administrative costs of VAT since the threshold reduces the number of filers.
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UK show that firms respond strongly to such notches by bunching below these thresholds.
However, results might be different for developing countries which typically rely heavily
on the VAT (Keen and Lockwood 2006, 2010). Armenia is not an exception as almost
half of its total tax revenue stems from the VAT (see Figure 1 in Section 2). Moreover,
developing countries are typically told to set a higher threshold than more advanced
countries due to higher compliance costs.5 Analyzing the case of Armenia – which has an
unusually large VAT threshold that is higher than in any OECD country – allows us to
study whether this intuitive policy advice prevails in practice. We do not find evidence
for significant bunching in the distribution of firms around the VAT notch. A plausible
interpretation is that the VAT registration threshold in Armenia is set sufficiently high so
that the compliance costs of firms of this size, on average, do not outweigh their benefits
from registering as VAT payers.
Second, and related to the administrative and accounting policies, our evidence points
to the strongest response of firms to the administrative notch where locally set simplified
accounting rules can be used instead of having to comply with the IFRS. We find some,
but much weaker, response to the administrative notch where the frequency to file and
pay taxes decreases from monthly to quarterly for smaller firms. These two results have
important policy implications and contribute to the literature on the behavioral responses
of firms to tax rates by extending the evidence to administrative policies. While the
literature seems to have ignored the question of whether the frequency of filing and paying
taxes matters, a body of mostly accounting research studies the impact of IFRS (or US-
GAAP) adoption on capital markets (see, e.g., Daske 2006, Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer,
and Riedl 2010, Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 2013) such as firms’ cost of equity capital
and liquidity (for an earlier review see, e.g., Ball 2006). Our contribution to this literature
5The existing literature on optimal indirect taxation models the VAT threshold as a trade-off between
tax revenues and potential inefficiencies implied by the differential treatment of firms on one hand, and
collection and administration costs on the other hand (Keen and Mintz 2004, Dharmapala, Slemrod,
and Wilson 2011, Brashares, Knittel, Silverstein, and Yuskavage 2014, Kanbur and Keen 2014). Higher
registration thresholds, however, do not come without costs, as they imply lost tax revenues (especially
so for the VAT dependent countries) and more opportunities for informal activity related to a narrowed
base for the VAT. Note that Best et al. (2015) show that developing countries can have different optimal
tax schemes compared to developed countries.
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is to show that firms – SMEs in our case – respond strongly to the mandatory adoption
of IFRS by bunching below the income-threshold where the regulation bites. This result
is in line with DeGeorge, Ferguson, and Spear (2012), which quantifies a significant and
direct cost of IFRS adoption on observable audit costs, increasing these by around 23%
on average in the year of adoption.
Third, we contribute to the literature that tries to quantify tax evasion on the micro
level.6 We exploit data on tax audits to shed light on the mechanisms behind firm re-
sponses. By comparing the estimated excess mass of firms for reported income versus
total income (which additionally includes the income detected during audits) and assum-
ing that audits lead to full compliance, we arrive at a lower bound estimate of around 60
percent of the response being driven by income underreporting. Relaxing the assumption
that audits lead to full compliance would increase the above estimate. In addition, au-
dited tax returns suggest that firms located just before the notch have about twice higher
evasion rates than the ones further away. If we apply more restrictive distributional as-
sumptions on this data, the estimated rate of income underreporting would approach to
100 percent, i.e., the response being entirely driven by income underreporting.
Of course, this evidence cannot be easily interpreted causally when audits are non-
random. Unfortunately, the audit data does not stem from a random sample of tax returns
as in, e.g., Kleven et al. (2011) from Denmark or the Tax Compliance Measurement
Program from the US. However, while tax authorities might selectively choose to carry
out more and/or stricter audits at firms which they perceive to be suspects of evasion,
we do not find the probability of being audited or the strictness of audits (proxied by
number of days spent on audits) to be correlated with observed firm characteristics.
The smooth distribution of audits around the notch that we find also has a clear policy
implication, which is that the tax authorities could improve their audit strategies by
targeting firms which have higher incentives to under-report income due to these size
6For recent papers see, e.g., Marion and Muehlegger (2008), Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and
Saez (2011), DeBacker, Heim, Tran, and Yuskavage (2015), Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2014), Best
et al. (2015), Casaburi and Troiano (2015), Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura (2016), Waseem (2016),
and for general reviews see Slemrod (2007), Alm (2012)).
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dependent regulations. Finally, we find that during years of audits reported income
increases, on average, by around 20 percent. However, not all of this translates into
higher tax revenues since every additional dollar of audit driven increase in reported
income is compensated by a 0.7-0.8 dollar increase in reported costs. This result is line
with Carrillo et al. (2016), who show that firms in Ecuador respond to randomized threat-
of-audit letters by increasing both reported income and reported costs at around the same
rate.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the Armenian
tax system in general and the size dependent regulations in particular. Section 3 presents
the sample and the data. Section 4 presents the results on the behavioral responses of
firms and explores the mechanisms behind the responses. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Context
Taxes in Armenia: In Armenia, as in many other developing countries, VAT and
corporate income taxes are a major source of tax revenue. This pattern can be seen in
Figure 1 with the VAT generating over half of total tax revenue in most years (or around
9% of GDP), and corporate income taxes coming second with around 15 percent of tax
revenue (or around 2% of GDP). Figure 1 also shows a generally low but increasing tax
to-GDP ratio of about 14-17 percent in 2006-2012. Although 2013 saw a large increase
in the tax to-GDP ratio, this was mainly due to some of the social security contributions
newly classified as part of the personal income taxes.7
The VAT in Armenia has a two rate structure with a standard 20 percent rate on
imports and the supplies of most goods and services by established firms, and a 0-rate
on exports and several exempted goods and services (such as agriculture and financial
services). The corporate income tax has a 20 percent flat rate on worldwide income for
residents and on income that has a source in Armenia for non-resident entities.
7Personal income taxes in Armenia are withholding taxes on wages and, therefore, do not apply to
firms’ income.
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Figure 1: Tax revenue to GDP in Armenia
Source: Own compilation based on data from ArmStat.
Notes: The jump in tax revenue to GDP in 2013 is mainly due to a major reform of the PIT system
after which some of the social security contributions have been classified as taxes. The PIT revenue to
GDP in 2012/2013 amounted to 2,3/6,0%, and the social security contributions to GDP added up to
3,2/0,4%.
Tax administration: As briefly discussed above, the quality of tax administration in
Armenia is a serious concern for its development. According to the World Bank, in 2010
Armenia was ranked 84th in the world by the Ease of Doing Business index with one of
the weakest areas being its taxation system at the 163rd place.8 Although recent years
have seen some progress with the overall ranking climbing to 50th in 2014, the “paying
taxes” rank still lags behind at 74th in the world. This situation may have more to
do with various inefficiencies inherent to the country’s tax administration rather than
to its tax rates. One survey conducted in 2013 among firms and entrepreneurs found
that about 50 percent of responses expressed that issues of tax administration are of
higher priority than other matters related to tax policy, while the responses naming tax
rates as the greatest concern made up about 30 percent (USAID 2014, p. 61). About
8The Ease of Doing Business index ranks countries according to several categories, such as the ease
of starting a business, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, registering property, getting credit, etc.
One of these categories is the ease of paying taxes, which measures the regulatory burden associated
with taxation and includes information on the statuary rates on several taxes for a medium-size limited
liability company, as well as the number of payments and the time required to prepare, file and pay these
taxes.
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Figure 2: Tax reform time-line, 2007-13
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32 percent of respondents of the same survey also thought that a major reason for tax
evasion is the inefficient tax administration (USAID 2014, p. 82) along with the high tax
rates (32 percent of respondents) and the deteriorating economic situation (21 percent of
respondents). An earlier survey finds that, indeed, these two types of taxes – VAT and
CIT – were the most time consuming taxes among all taxes firms paid in 2009, with an
average of about 53 and 50 hours spent annually on accounting for VAT and corporate
income taxes (International Finance Corporation 2011, p. 45).
The VAT notch: Figure 2 summarizes the major reforms that took place in the Ar-
menian corporate tax law in 2007-13. Among these we study, first, the VAT registration
threshold: firms with VAT exclusive (inclusive) sales of above 58,350 (70) million AMD
(or about 140,000 USD) are required to charge VAT on all sales thereby creating a notch
(Republic of Armenia 2014b, Article 3, paragraph 1); firms below the threshold can
voluntarily opt to register as VAT firms in which case they can also claim VAT returns.
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As described above, Armenia is an interesting case since the VAT threshold is currently
one of the highest in the world, and is higher than in any OECD member country (Table
A1). This level was reached after a major, almost twenty-fold, increase in 2009 which the
government cited as one of the crisis prevention mechanisms (Government of the Republic
of Armenia 2009).9
The administrative notch: Second, we study firms’ response to an administrative
size dependent threshold which aims to benefit smaller firms by creating favorable rules
of tax administration for SMEs. The threshold is set at 100 million AMD of total annual
gross income (60 before 2009) or about 240,000 USD. The thresholds applies to both
VAT and corporate income taxes. First, firms with turnovers not exceeding the threshold
are allowed to file tax returns and make the respective payments on a quarterly rather
than monthly basis. Second, these small and medium-size enterprises can use simplified
tax accounting procedures instead of having to comply with the International Financial
Reporting Standards (Republic of Armenia 2014a, Artcile 2, paragraph 3). The lower
frequency of tax returns is also applicable for firms employing not more than 5 employees
independent of their income, which we can use to disentangle any potential responses to
the two incentives.
Survey evidence suggests that, in the view of businesses, this threshold significantly
reduced the burden of tax compliance for small firms (USAID 2014). The WB’s Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of Armenian enterprises in
2013 also reveals a picture suggesting that this special treatment of SMEs might help
reduce their tax compliance costs. Of the 100 firms covered by the survey, 50 firms have
sales below the threshold and report on average corruption as an obstacle to current
operations to be 0.5 points lower (on a 0-4 scale) than the average firm and 0.75 points
lower than the 50 firms above the threshold.
9In 2015, the threshold for construction firms was raised further to 115 million AMD, and from 2017
announced reforms plan to decrease the general VAT threshold to 40 million AMD.
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Other notches: In Figure 2, we show several other features of the tax systems, which
are also of potential interest, since there is not much evidence on firm response to these
policy tools. We attempted to also analyze these, but could not arrive at conclusive
evidence often due to data limitations. First, there is a size threshold below which
firms qualify for a voluntary simple tax on turnover instead of the corporate income tax.
This was set at 30 million AMD of turnover for 2007-08, abolished afterwards, then re-
introduced again in 2013 at a higher level of 58,35 million AMD. The turnover tax is
to replace the value added and/or the corporate tax, while in our data we only observe
the corporate tax return, therefore making the study of the turnover tax not straightfor-
ward.10 Second, firms with an income of more than 500 million AMD are typically under
the authority of the large taxpayer unit. This implies, for example, different enforcement
rules such as higher audit rates. Although this is again an interesting and policy relevant
issue, we cannot study this policy in our setting easily because of the few number of firms
in this part of the size distribution of firms (there are about 250-300 firms that operate
under the large taxpayer unit), but also because the tax authorities may choose to select
firms into the unit which are smaller than the threshold. Instead, we refer to Almunia
and Lopez-Rodriguez (2014) who study the firm-level effects of the Spanish large tax-
payer unit. Third and finally, firms with turnovers exceeding 1 billion AMD are required
to publish their financial statements. The low frequency of firms again prevents us from
studying this threshold. The size distribution of these large firms is presented in Figure
A1 of the Appendix. While there is also bunching visible, there are too few observations
to estimate statistically significant effects.
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Table 1: Sample statistics
Observations Mean Gross Income Mean Number
By Main Industry in thousand AMD of Employees
Trade (G) 14,015 590,439 16
Services (I, L, M, N, T) 11,701 127,149 23
Utilities (D, E, P, Q, R) 9,553 394,499 78
Manufacturing (C) 6,729 505,872 43
Construction (F) 6,724 292,734 22
IT (J) 2,546 693,493 43
Transport (H) 2,442 509,798 49
Finance (K) 2,196 1,321,816 59
Mining (B) 1,365 691,434 39
Public administration (P) 219 81,404 29
Missing 10,999 59,281 8
Observations Mean Gross Income Mean Number
By Legal Incorporation in thousand AMD of Employees
Limited Liability Company 50,670 272,968 15
Closed Joint Stock Company 8,883 1,233,848 100
State Enterprise 3,395 96,247 92
Open Joint Stock Company 2,125 497,549 46
Trade Cooperative 1,553 72,923 11
Local Government 1,194 25,141 21
Non-Governmental Organization 1,149 27,496 17
Foundation 729 129,922 50
Other 680 82,462 30
Total 70,378 376,556 32
Notes: NACE first-letter industry-codes in parentheses.
3 Data and Sample
Our analysis is based on administrative data on the full population of Armenian firms
that file corporate tax returns, and covers the years 2007 to 2013.11 The data are obtained
from the Central Bank of Armenia. They include all the standard information from the
tax returns such as gross income and deductible costs (each with their detailed items),
together with information on audits and detected tax evasion, as well as some basic firm
characteristics. The annual number of entities filing for corporate taxes varies between
10For a discussion of special tax regimes in transition countries, see, Engelschalk and Loeprick (2016),
and for an application on small firms in Pakistan, see, Best et al. (2015).
11The sample does not cover firms which do not file corporate tax returns, such as sole-proprietorships
that operate under special tax regimes for micro-enterprises. Firms that do not register for VAT but file
corporate tax returns are included.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SD P25 P50 P75
Tax-items:
Gross Income (thousand AMD) 70,402 376,446 4,897,106 5,210 27,731 120,345
Annual growth of gross income 40,307 0.23 0.96 -0.28 0.03 0.39
Total deductions / Gross income 67,344 0.98 0.78 0.84 0.93 0.99
Profit tax / Gross income 67,271 0.03 0.91 0.01 0.01 0.03
Additional income due audits / Gross income 8,805 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.04
Input costs / Gross income 26,143 0.62 1.70 0.35 0.70 0.86
Firm-characteristics:
Number of employees 70,161 32.2 160.6 2.3 7.0 20.0
Age of firm (years) 90,854 7.28 5.22 3.00 7.00 11.00
Tax-audits:
Audits announced in t-1 (dummy) 35,871 0.12 0.33
Audits executed in t (dummy) 25,564 0.25 0.43
Duration of audits (days) 25,564 3.62 11.43
Notes: The first seven variables are available over 2007-2013 and come from corporate income tax returns
(item numbers of the tax return in parentheses): Gross income (C0100), total deductions (C0200), profit
tax (C1300), Additional income due audits (C0119), input costs or deductions related to the purchase of
goods (C0201), number of employees (A). Data on Annual growth of gross income and Total deductions
/ Gross income is trimmed at top/bottom, respectively, 5 and 1 percentiles. Age of firm was extracted
from the website of the Tax Service of the Republic of Armenia in July, 2014 (taxservice.am). The audit
variables – audits planned, audits executed and duration of audits – are published at the same source
and are available for the years 2012 and 2013.
9,000 and 13,000 firms. Some of this variation is due to the abolishment of a simple tax
on turnover for small firms in 2006-07 (that replaces the VAT and/or corporate income
tax) and its re-introduction in 2013 (Figure 1).
Table 1 presents some basic statistics - frequency of firms, mean annual income and
mean number of employees - per industry of the economy (top panel) and by type of
firms’ legal incorporation (bottom panel). The five largest industries by number of firms
are trade (20%), services (17%), utilities (14%), manufacturing (10%), and construction
(10%); and the most common types of firms are Limited Liability Companies (LLCs, 71%)
and Closed Joint Stock Companies (CJSCs, 13%). Table 2 additionally presents the full
summary statistics - including the main items of the tax return, firm characteristics and
information on tax audits - for the total sample.
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4 Results
We start by graphically studying the size distribution of firms around the VAT and
administrative notches in sub-sections 3 and 4, respectively. The following sub-section 4.3
presents the bunching estimates and the according elasticities of the behavioral responses
of firms based on back of the envelope calculations. In sub-sections 4.4 and 4.5, we then
study the mechanisms behind these average responses, and whether the responses and
mechanisms are different for heterogeneous firms.
4.1 Response to the VAT Notch
Figure 3 plots the frequency of firms around the VAT notch. The first vertical line is the
threshold in terms of income without accounting for the VAT (58,350 thousand AMD)
which applies to non-VAT firms, and the second vertical line is the threshold including
the VAT (70,000 thousand AMD) applicable for VAT registered firms. Generally we are
unable to detect a strong response to the VAT notch by firms paying the corporate income
tax.12
This result is robust when looking at the heterogeneity of response per sector (Figure
3c) and according to the quartile of the share of input costs in turnover (Figure 3d). This
distinction is motivated by the reasoning that firms with a higher share of input costs
have higher incentives to register in the VAT system (therefore less incentives to bunch at
the notch by shifting income) because only then can they claim back their VAT inputs.
Figure A2d of the Appendix demonstrates that trade firms have a much more right-skewed
distribution of their input costs than, for example, construction (A2a), manufacturing
(A2b), or service (A2c) firms. However, notable differences in the distribution of these
different firms around the VAT notch do not emerge. This result is in line with Boonzaaier
12This evidence does not preclude that individual entrepreneurs or other types of micro firms – who
do not file for corporate taxes and thus do not appear in our data – respond to the VAT. Importantly,
however, the VAT notch in our sample does not necessarily interact with the margin of the decision to
stay an entrepreneur or to incorporate. This is typically the case for turnover based taxes which often
replace the VAT and/or corporate income taxes, and apply to the same threshold as the VAT registration
threshold. Turnover taxes in Armenia, however, were abolished for the years 2008 through 2012.
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Figure 3: Response to VAT notch
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(d) By share of input costs
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Notes: Figures plot the frequency of firms per bin around the VAT notch. The VAT exclusive and
inclusive thresholds are denoted by, respectively, the first and second vertical lines. All sub-figures use
data from 2009-13 other than sub-figure (b) which relies only on 2013 data since the information on the
VAT registration status is available only as of July 2014 (and therefore may not be accurate if firms have
(de)registered). The sectors in sub-figure (c) are aggregated using the NACE classification (first letter
industry codes in parentheses: manufacturing (C), construction (F), trade (G), services (I, L, M, N, T),
other (all other sectors including firms with missing industry codes). The share of inputs in sub-figure
(d) refers to the ratio of deductions directly related to the purchase of goods in gross income (see also
Figure A2).
et al. (2016) who show very small responses to the VAT threshold in South Africa (which
also has a high threshold).
A potential explanation of this result, which is opposite to recent evidence from Japan,
the UK and Finland (Onji 2009, Liu and Lockwood 2015, Harju et al. 2015), is that the
VAT registration threshold in Armenia is sufficiently high so that the compliance costs
of firms of this size, on average, do not outweigh their benefits (such as the right to claim
14
back the tax on inputs) from registering as VAT firms. Not surprisingly, the data shows
that approximately 40 percent of firms that were below the VAT threshold in 2013 have
voluntarily registered for VAT (Figure 3b). In a closer neighborhood to the notch, say 10
bins before it (equivalent to 25 million AMD), there are even more voluntarily registered
VAT firms than non-VAT firms.13
4.2 Response to the Administrative Notch
Unlike the VAT notch, we find a strong response to the administrative notch. In Figure 4a,
we plot the frequency of firms over different bin sizes around the threshold (normalized to
0). Figure 4b shows that for-profit enterprises bunch, but state owned ones do not. Figure
4c allows disentangling the incentives created by a lower frequency of tax returns and
payments (which applies to firms with 5 or less employees independent of turnover) and
the simplified tax accounting regime (instead of IFRS). It seems that both rules matter,
but the accounting rule (i.e. the difference between small and large firms) generates a
stronger response (we return to this issue below). This bunching evidence is also robust
across industries (Figure 4d). In the latter we find that trade firms respond strongest
to this administrative threshold, which can perhaps be explained by their higher evasion
opportunities (again, more below).
Going one step further, in Figure 5 we exploit the panel dimension of our data. Since
the administrative threshold was changed substantially in 2009 increasing from 60 to
100 million AMD, we can test whether firms start to (de-)bunch at the (lower) higher
threshold after the reform. Figure 5 shows that this is indeed the case, and that the
response is not only persistent, but is also getting stronger in time. Looking at differences
in bunching also allows to relax some of the identifying assumption. We previously
assumed the size distribution of firms around the threshold to be flat in absence of the
notch, now it is sufficient to assume that the change in the size distribution of firms would
13Unreported probit regressions on the determinants of voluntary registrations show that these firms
are on average younger, have fewer employees, and have a smaller share of input costs relative to income.
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Figure 4: Response to administrative notch
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Notes: Figures plot the frequency of firms per bin around the administrative notch. The administrative
threshold is normalized to 0 and is denoted by a vertical line.
have been flat in the absence of the notch. This helps to rule out several biases, such as
the potential concern of overestimating the size of the firm response due to round number
bunching (or other, perhaps unobservable, factors that have not changed over time).
We complement the graphical evidence by estimating probit regressions on the deter-
minants to bunch. The results are summarized in Table A2 in the Appendix, where in
columns 1-6 and 7-12 firms are defined to be “bunchers” if they are located within, respec-
tively, a 5% and 10% window below the administrative notch. These estimates confirm
the graphical evidence that bunching is persistent in a way that the bunching behavior
in year t − 1 is a significant predictor of bunching today. Furthermore, the regressions
provide further descriptive evidence on the determinants of bunching behavior. The share
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Figure 5: Response to change in administrative notch
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Notes: Figure plots the change in the distribution of firms over time compared to the pre-reform period
(2007-08). The pre- and post-reform administrative thresholds are denoted by, respectively, the first and
second vertical lines.
of remitted profit taxes (in some regressions also the total deductions) in gross income
is a positive predictor for bunching behavior, albeit not consistently significant for the
latter. Assuming that taxes and expenditures are similar below and above the threshold,
this result suggests that bunching at the threshold occurs through income underreporting
(we investigate this further below). Third, the announcement in year t− 1 of an audit in
the coming year reduces the probability of firms to bunch (columns: 4 and 10).
4.3 Bunching Estimate at the Administrative Threshold
Next we follow the recent literature on bunching (Saez 2010, Chetty et al. 2011, Kleven
and Waseem 2013) to estimate the size of the response at the administrative threshold.14
Under the assumption that firms have smooth and heterogeneous preferences over gross
income y, firms would locate themselves smoothly along the gross income distribution
in the absence of notches. When introducing the (administrative) notch, firms below or
directly at the threshold do not change their behavior. Firms in a certain area above the
14Kleven (2016) provides a review of the bunching method and we focus on the key aspects for brevity.
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notch have the incentive to relocate to the notch – either by generating less income or by
underreporting it.
We estimate the excess mass at the notch following the bunching literature in three
steps. First, we center the gross income distribution such that the threshold is exactly
at zero, and group firms into small bins. Second, we estimate the counterfactual density
(how the distribution would have looked in the absence of bunching at the notch) by fitting
a flexible polynomial function to the observed distribution, excluding the area [yL; yH ]
around the notch threshold point from the observed distribution.15 Third, we estimate
the excess bunching by relating the actual number of firms ci close to the threshold within
the interval [yL; y
∗] to the estimated counterfactual density cˆi in the same region:
bˆ =
∑y∗
i=yL
(ci − cˆi)∑y∗
i=yL
(cˆi/Ni)
(1)
where Ni is the number of bins within [yL; y
∗]. As it is common in the literature, we
calculate standard errors for all estimates using a bootstrap procedure.
Figure 6a shows that the excess mass of firms bunching at the threshold is economically
large and statistically significant. For the full sample, we find an estimate of the excess
mass below the threshold of 1.57. Figure A3 in the Appendix provides with sensitivity
tests of this estimate of the excess mass to the selection of the excluded region (a) and
to the choice of the polynomial when fitting the counterfactual distribution (b). These
tests show that the estimate of the excess mass is fairly robust across both dimensions.
In Figures 6 b & c, we differentiate between firms with 5 or less employees and those
with more in order to disentangle the effects of simplified accounting rules from the effects
of the change in the frequency of filing. Firms with 5 or less employees qualify to use the
simplified accounting rules independent of their income, therefore any response of smaller
15Due to imperfect control and uncertainty about gross income, it is likely that we do not observe
sharp bunching exactly at the threshold but rather a cluster of firms in a region below it. As is common
in the literature, we determine the lower and upper limits of the excluded regions (yL and yH) based on
visual inspection of the distribution as the point in the distribution where the bunching behavior begins
and ends. In Figure A3, we then provide sensitivity tests of the estimate of excess mass to the selection
of the excluded region.
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Figure 6: Bunching estimate at administrative notch
(a) Full sample
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance to administrative threshold (bin=1000 thousand AMD)
b=1.569 (0.3033)
(b) Firms with 5 or less employees
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(c) Firms with over 5 employees
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Notes: Figures plot and estimate the size of bunching around the 0-normalized administrative threshold
(i.e., the bunch-point) using the method developed by Chetty et al. (2011). The bunching estimate is
reported in the top right corner for every sub-figure with standard errors in parenthesis. The counterfac-
tual distribution is estimated by fitting a polynomial of the 7th degree, and by considering 15 (50) bins
on the left and right sides of the bunch point where a bin equals 1000 thousand AMD. The bunching
windows on the left and right sides of the bunch point are denoted by dashed vertical lines.
firms to the administrative threshold should be driven by the frequency of filing rules.
Larger firms respond more strongly than smaller ones (1.65 vs. 1), implying that the
international accounting rules trigger larger responses than the frequency of filing alone.
Similar to the sensitivity tests of Figure A3, in Figure A4 we study the robustness of
the bunching estimate separately for accounting rules and for frequency of filing. The
response to the change in the frequency of filing is relatively small and is not consistently
significant across the selection of the excluded region.
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The excess mass can serve as a sufficient statistic to calculate an elasticity (Saez 2010,
Kleven and Waseem 2013). However, this is not straightforward, since for an elasticity
estimate at the administrative threshold one needs estimates of both the amount of
compliance costs and the change of compliance costs at the threshold. Regarding the
former, Eichfelder and Vaillancourt (2014) provide a survey of such estimates for many
countries. Armenia, however, is not included. For OECD countries, they report average
compliance costs of firm taxes between 0.4 and 3.4% of turnover for SMEs. The estimates
for less developed countries such as South Africa or Ukraine are somewhat higher. The
authors also find that about two thirds of the compliance costs are due to accounting
rules and of these, another two thirds are due to financial accounting regulations. Based
on a taxpayer survey in Armenia, International Finance Corporation (2011) estimates
tax compliance costs to be highly regressive ranging from about 18% of gross income
for micro firms to about 1% for medium-sized firms. Coolidge (2012) presents further
survey based estimates of tax compliance costs in developing countries. Given these
estimates we assume the share of compliance costs in total gross income to be between
2.5% and 7.5%. As to the change of compliance costs at the threshold, and again as a
rough approximation, we rely on DeGeorge et al. (2012) who quantifies that the adoption
of IFRS increases observable expenses on audits, on average, by around 23%. Also,
comparing the 50 firms that are below and above the threshold from the BEEPS survey
of 2013 (see Section 2), suggests that the difference in self-reported compliance costs
among these two groups might be around 15% on average. Based on this, we assume
four values (between 5% and 30%) for the change in compliance costs. Together with the
three different values for the share of compliance costs, we have 9 different scenarios for
the back of the envelope calculation of elasticities as shown in Panel A of Table 3.
The resulting elasticities vary between 0.13 and 2.35. Using a change in compliance
costs of 20% (DeGeorge et al. 2012) and a share of compliance costs in gross income of
5% (Eichfelder and Vaillancourt 2014) would yield a baseline estimate for the elasticity
with respect to compliance costs of around 0.4 – which would be comparable to tax
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Table 3: Back of the envelope estimates
Panel A: Estimate of elasticity
Change of compliance Share of compliance costs in gross income
costs at the threshold 2.5% 5% 7.5%
5% 0.785 1.569 2.354
10% 0.392 0.785 1.177
20% 0.196 0.392 0.588
30% 0.131 0.262 0.392
Panel B: Estimate of change of compliance costs at the threshold
Share of compliance costs in gross income
Elasticity 2.5% 5% 7.5%
0.50 7.8% 15.7% 23.5%
1.00 3.9% 7.8% 11.8%
1.50 2.6% 5.2% 7.8%
2.00 2.0% 3.9% 5.9%
2.50 1.6% 3.1% 4.7%
elasticities for developed countries (see, e.g., Devereux et al. 2014, who find an elasticity
of 0.29 for the UK). Unfortunately, we do not have a direct estimate of a tax elasticity for
Armenia. However, Waseem (2016), for example, estimates an intensive-margin elasticity
for SMEs in Pakistan to be around 2, that is an order of magnitude larger than estimates
for richer countries. An elasticity of such a magnitude would be in line either with a lower
change in the compliance costs at the threshold, or a higher share of compliance costs in
gross income, or both. To shed some more light on this, in a second approach, we assume
a value for the elasticity and calculate the implied change of compliance costs at the
threshold. We assume a wide range of elasticities between 0.5% & 2.5%, and display the
corresponding estimates for the change of compliance costs in Panel B of Table 3. The
resulting values vary between 1.7% and 23.5%. Using an elasticity of 2 as for Pakistan
(Waseem 2016) and a share of compliance costs in gross income of 5% (Eichfelder and
Vaillancourt 2014) would yield a 3.9% change in compliance costs at the threshold. While
we cannot give exact estimates for the elasticity and nor for the change in compliance
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costs, we believe these back of the envelope calculations provide some insights about the
range of plausible values.
4.4 Do Firms Bunch Through Tax Evasion?
One advantage of our study is that we are able to make use of audited tax returns to
study the mechanisms of income shifting by firms. The question is whether the response
of firms to the administrative threshold that we have found works through real response
in supply or through income underreporting.
Figure 7: Detected tax evasion
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Notes: Figures plot the additional unreported income detected during audits as a share in gross income
per bin. First and second vertical lines denote, respectively, the VAT and administrative thresholds.
In Figure 7, we plot the additional income that was detected by the tax authorities
during audits averaged across bins. It demonstrates a spike in detected tax evasion just
below the administrative threshold. The size of detected evasion is very large at about 10
percent of gross income, and is about double the average evasion rate further away from
the threshold. This evidence suggests that the response of firms is at least partly driven
by income underreporting. However, in order to arrive at an estimate of how much of the
22
total bunching response is driven by underreporting relative to a real response, we need
to make some assumptions or restrictions on the sample.
First, we start with back of the envelope calculations. For this, we need an assump-
tion on from which part of the distribution the bunching firms come from. The average
bunching firm is located one bin before the threshold. The difference in underreporting
between bunching and non-bunching firms is 5 percent on average. 5 percent of gross
income around the threshold (100 million AMD) corresponds to two bins (2 × 2.5 mil-
lion AMD). Hence, if we were to assume that the average bunching firm would belong
to one bin above the thresholds under full compliance, this back of the envelope ap-
proach would yield that, on average, the behavioral response is entirely driven by income
underreporting.
Second, we can study how the notch distorts the total amount of production. Figures
8 a, b & c plot the total amount of, respectively, gross income, deductions (and their
composition) and detected income due audits for all firms in each income bin around
the administrative notch. The figures show, quite clearly, the amount of additional in-
come and deductions in response to the notch. The amount of total income around the
threshold is about 30 percent more than that further away from the threshold (sub-figures
8a), whereas the same ratio for total detected income due audits is about twice as large
(sub-figures 8c). This comparison reaffirms our interpretation that the bunching firms
have much higher evasion rates. Also, looking at the composition of income and deduc-
tions may give additional hints on the types of items of the tax return that are perhaps
easier manipulated in response to the notch: reported income from sales of goods and,
symmetrically, deductions for related purchases.
Third, we can restrict the analysis to audited firms and study how the bunching re-
sponse differs for reported income versus total income (which additionally includes the
income detected during audits). If the bunching response were driven by tax evasion,
we should find a rightward shift of the distribution and a lower bunching rate at the
threshold after accounting for the amount of underreported income detected during au-
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Figure 8: Total size of the response
(a) Total gross income
(b) Total deductions
(c) Total detected income due audits
Notes: Sub-Figures (a), (b) and (c) plot the total amount of, respectively, gross income, deductions and
detected income due audits per bin around the administrative notch. Income and deduction categories
correspond to the following items in the tax return, in sub-figure a (from bottom to top): C0101, C0102,
C0103, all else; in sub-figure (b): C0201, C0202, C0203, C0210, all else; and in sub-figure (c); C0119.
Figure 9: Bunching by reported and total income of audited firms
(a) Reported income
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(b) Total income (reported and detected)
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Notes: Figures present bunching estimates at the administrative threshold similar to Figure 6. The
sample is restricted to audited firms. Sub-figures (a) & (b) plot the density of firms, respectively, by
reported income and by total income which additionally includes the income detected during audits.
dits. Consistent with this prediction, in Figure 9 a & b we see that the excess mass of
firms by reported income is around 60 percent larger than that by total income. Under
full detection and absent any real responses, we should expect a smooth distribution of
true income. However, the much smaller but significant excess mass of firms after audits
in Figure 9b may still be due to non-detected evasion responses, since tax authorities can
rarely reach full compliance even by extensive audits. The difference in the estimated
excess mass of firms by reported income and by total (including detected) income – which
is around 60 percent – is a lower bound estimate of the tax evasion response.
4.5 Response and Evasion by Heterogenous Firms
To exploit any potential heterogeneities in firm response, we divide the sample according
to whether firms are growing or shrinking (defined as those reporting higher or lower
income in year t compared to year t − 1). The argument is that size dependent tax
(and other) policies that favor SMEs may distort the incentives of firms to grow beyond
such thresholds. These regulations are often held responsible for the empirical regularity
of a “missing middle” which can be observed in the size distribution of firms of some
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Figure 10: Response by heterogeneous firms
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(b) Shrinking firms
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(c) Manufacturing, Construction & Mining
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(d) Services
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(e) Trade & Transport
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(f) Public Administration & Utilities
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance to administrative threshold (bin=1000 thousand AMD
b=0.032(0.7804)
Notes: Figures present bunching estimates at the administrative threshold similar to Figure 6(a). In
sub-figures (a) & (b) the sample is split between, respectively, growing and shrinking (b) firms (which
are defined as those reporting, respectively, higher or lower gross nominal income in year t compared to
year t − 1). In sub-figures (c) to (f) the sample is split between four main industries defined for each
sub-figure.
Figure 11: Detected tax evasion by heterogeneous firms
(a) Growing v.s. shrinking firms
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(b) By industry
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
A
dd
iti
on
al
 in
co
m
e 
du
e 
au
di
ts
 / 
G
ro
ss
 in
co
m
e
-60000 -40000 -20000 0 20000 40000
Distance to administrative threshold (bin=2500 thousand AMD)
Manufacturing, Construction & Mining Services
Trade & Transport Utilities & PA
Notes: Figure plots the additional unreported income detected during audits as a share in gross income
per bin around the VAT and administrative thresholds (respectively, first and second vertical lines). The
sample is split between growing and shrinking firms (sub-figure a), and among main industries (sub-figure
b).
countries.16 Figure 10 shows that growing firms respond strongly at the administrative
notch (sub-figure 10a), while, as expected, we do not find statistically significant bunching
evidence for shrinking firms (sub-figure 10b).
We also study heterogeneous responses by industry in Figure 10. As expected, firms
in the industry that we broadly call Public Administration & Utilities (includes NACE-
codes: D,E, P, Q, & R) are the only group of firms for which we do not find evidence
of bunching. Such absence of bunching by declining firms and public administration
firms acts as a placebo test of sorts on both of the results that firms respond to the
administrative notch and they do so by income underreporting.
Another exercise is to extend the results of Figure 7 on the amount of detected evasion
for both growing and shrinking firms, and for firms in different industries. By plotting
the mean amounts of the size of detected evasion per bin separately for growing and
shrinking firms in Figure 11(a) we additionally show that the response can be, again,
largely explained by the underreporting behavior of growing firms. Owing to the re-
duced number of observations the data gets noisy when studying audited firms by sector;
16See, e.g., Dharmapala et al. (2011). Hsieh and Olken (2014), however, argue that this may not be
the case.
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however, Figure 11(b) provides suggestive evidence that evasion rates and opportunities
maybe higher for firms operating in some industries. These patterns are consistent with
our earlier results of Figures 4 & 10.
4.6 Endogeneity and Effects of Audits
The finding of higher detected evasion below the thresholds could be driven by endogenous
selection of firms. For instance, tax authorities could optimize their enforcement strategies
by also responding to notches and kinks of the tax system where firms’ incentives to evade
change discontinuously.
Figure 12: Probability and duration of audits
(a) Probability of audits
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Notes: Sub-figure (a) plots the share of audited firms per bin and year, and sub-figure (b) plots the mean
duration of these audits. the first, second and third vertical lines denote, respectively, the exclusive and
inclusive VAT and administrative thresholds.
Figure 12a shows that this is not likely to be the case. Firms located just below the
notch, on average, do not get audited more frequently. This suggests that, first, our tax
evasion explanation of firms’ bunching behavior is not driven by endogenous audits and,
second, that tax authorities could make their audit strategy more efficient by targeting
firms which have higher incentives to evade. Back of the envelope calculations show that
the detection of underreported income solely by firms located at the administrative notch
(which amount to less than 1 percent of all firms) could recover income of as much as
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10% of 2013’s budget deficit. We also demonstrate an increase in the duration of audits
after the administrative notch in Figure 12b. This may be due to the administrative
complexities created by more frequent tax returns and more stringent accounting rules
which create additional difficulties for firms as well as for tax authorities.
In a final exercise, we study whether audits have some implications for firms’ reporting
behavior. Such an analysis is, of course, heavily constrained by the likely non-randomness
of audits. However, in an event study design, we can exploit the dynamic structure of the
data to study whether audits are correlated to firms’ pre and post treatment outcomes.
In Figure 13, we find that audits mostly do not correlate with past outcomes, that is,
after controlling for a firm’s observable characteristics and several fixed effects (industry,
legal form, region, year, and firm), its reporting behavior in years t − 2 and t − 1, on
average, does not significantly affect the likelihood of an audit in year t. However, in year
t, audits significantly increase firm’s reported income by an average of about 20 percent
(sub-figure 13a). This positive effect persists after the audit, but declining in size and
reaching an increase of around 10 percent in reported income two years following the
audit.
Firms are likely to evade taxes both by underreporting of income and overreporting of
costs. However, it seems that audits effectively target only the underreporting of income
by increasing income, while the opposite holds for deductions. That is, interestingly, the
audit driven increase in reported income is partly compensated by an increase in reported
deductions (sub-figure 13b). Quantitatively, every additional dollar of reported income
in years t, t+ 1 & t+ 2 is matched by, respectively, 0.68, 0.81 & 0.77 dollars of additional
deductions. This result is line with Carrillo et al. (2016), who show that firms in Ecuador
respond to randomized threat-of-audit letters by increasing both reported income and
reported costs at around the same rate. In balance, the profit tax liability in our sample
increases much more in the year of an audit than in the two following years (sub-figure
13c), while the effective tax rate is not significantly affected by an audit (sub-figure 13d).
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Figure 13: Effects of audits on firm reporting over time
(a) Ln Reported Income (before audits)
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Notes: Figures plot point estimates from regressing audit dummy in year t−h, where h = (−2,−1, 0, 1, 2),
on (a) income, (b) deductions, (c) profit tax liability, and (d) effective tax rate. Vertical lines denote the
95% confidence intervals. Each sub-figure represents one regression. All regressions include fixed effects
for firms, industries, legal forms, regions, and years; and control for log number of employees, and firm
age in years. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the behavioral responses of Armenian firms to incentives implicit in the
tax system. The specific attention is on the VAT registration threshold which is unusually
high in Armenia, and two administrative thresholds that relax the tax compliance costs
for SMEs. Our evidence suggests that firms most strongly respond to the administrative
notch where locally set simplified accounting rules can be used instead of having to
comply with the IFRS. We find some, but much weaker, response to the notch where
the frequency to file and pay taxes decreases from monthly to quarterly for smaller firms.
Unlike the existing evidence from developed countries, we do not find a strong response to
the large VAT threshold. This battery of evidence suggests that in a developing country
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with a weak enforcement environment tax administration may matter more for firms’
decisions than taxes.
In such an environment with potentially high rates of tax evasion, however, it is cru-
cial to understand the mechanisms behind the response of firms. We show that the
administrative notch distorts the incentives for SMEs to grow beyond the notch, since
it creates discontinuously higher tax compliance costs for them. However, the evidence
from audited tax returns suggests that the response is almost entirely driven by income
underreporting (tax evasion) rather than real production response. This empirical result
is not entirely consistent with traditional tax deterrence models where the probability to
be caught along with penalties for evasion, marginal tax rates and risk-aversion predict
the level of tax evasion. Such a puzzle occurs because in Armenia the audit rates are very
high – about every fifth firm per year – while the other three parameters are probably
somewhat standard. A potential explanation is that audits are not effective, or in other
words susceptible to corruption.
These findings have direct policy implications for designing an efficient and equitable
tax system. First, it seems that the VAT registration threshold in Armenia is set suffi-
ciently high so that the compliance costs of firms of this size, on average, do not outweigh
their benefits from registering as VAT payers. Yet, it is still an open question whether
it is actually set too high. Second, regarding the administrative threshold, the evidence
demonstrates that SMEs experience a significant benefit from rules that relax their com-
pliance costs. This means that cleverly designed tax administration rules may have a
significant impact on bolstering the SME sector. However, it is not ex-ante clear whether
such policies that grant SMEs preferential treatments are welfare improving, since a signif-
icant amount of tax revenue is lost due to evasion. Therefore, the third policy implication
is that such incentive mechanisms should be accompanied by optimized audit strategies
which should target firms (and sectors) which have higher incentives (and opportunities)
to underreport income. Finally, our results – that firms are much more responsive to
administrative than tax regulations and that their response is almost entirely driven by
31
tax evasion – suggests that significant reforms have to be implemented to improve the
tax administration.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Size-distribution of firms, 2007-13
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Notes: Figure shows the size-distribution of larger firms in bins of 100 million AMD in the years 2007 to
2013. Data is trimmed below 100 (where most - about 72% - of observations are) and above 5,000 (where
only about 1% of observations are) million AMD of gross income. The first, second and third vertical
lines denote three thresholds where, respectively, rules of tax administration change, firms qualify to
enter the large taxpayer unit, and firms are obliged to publish financial statements (for more details, see,
Figure 2).
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Figure A2: Distribution of input costs to turnover by sector
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Notes: Figures plot histograms of firms per industry (and in (f) for all firms) according to the ratio of
deductions directly related to the purchase of goods in gross income.
Figure A3: Sensitivity of bunching estimates
(a) Choice of excluded region
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Notes: Figures present sensitivity tests of the bunching estimate of Figure 6a: (a) to the selection of the
excluded region (x-axis denotes the excluded bins of 1,000 thousand AMD); and (b) to the choice of the
polynomial in estimating the counterfactual distribution (x-axis denotes the degree of the polynomial).
Vertical lines denote the 95% confidence intervals.
Figure A4: Response to accounting rules v.s. frequency of filing
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Notes: Figures presents the bunching estimates separately for small and large firms across the choice
of the excluded area (x-axis denotes the excluded bins of 1,000 thousand AMD). Firms with 5 or less
employees qualify to use the simplified accounting rules independent of their income, therefore any
response should be driven by the frequency of filing rules.
Table A1: VAT registration thresholds in USD around the world in 2013
No Country Threshold No Country Threshold No Country Threshold
1 Singapore 799,169 36 Morocco 59,485 71 India 8,533
2 Jersey 468,999 37 Thailand 58,582 72 Norway 8,511
3 Seychelles 414,652 38 Kenya 58,057 73 Belgium 7,409
4 Kazakhstan 346,200 39 Indonesia 57,355 74 El Salvador 5,714
5 Azerbaijan 152,956 40 Trinidad & Tobago 55,878 75 Algeria 1,260
6 Zambia 148,261 41 Czech Republic 51,097 76 Belarus 0
7 Armenia 142,447 42 New Zealand 49,204 77 Bolivia 0
8 Isle of Man 123,503 43 Pakistan 49,199 78 Bonaire, S. Eust. & Saba 0
9 United Kingdom 123,503 44 Moldova 47,669 79 Chile 0
10 Gabon 121,448 45 Poland 47,459 80 Colombia 0
11 Papua New Guinea 111,383 46 Albania 47,318 81 Costa Rica 0
12 Argentina 109,903 47 Malta 46,471 82 Dominican Republic 0
13 France 108,211 48 Philippines 45,222 83 Ecuador 0
14 Switzerland 107,886 49 Macedonia 43,108 84 Greece 0
15 South Africa 103,573 50 Croatia 40,316 85 Guatemala 0
16 Japan 102,464 51 Austria 39,832 86 Honduras 0
17 Ireland 99,581 52 China 38,736 87 Iceland 0
18 Lebanon 99,502 53 Ukraine 37,533 88 Italy 0
19 Serbia 93,942 54 Panama 36,000 89 Korea 0
20 Madagascar 90,624 55 Bulgaria 33,931 90 Mexico 0
21 Romania 86,303 56 Luxembourg 33,194 91 Netherlands 0
22 Barbados 80,000 57 Malaysia 31,737 92 Nicaragua 0
23 Bangladesh 76,821 58 Rwanda 30,929 93 Nigeria 0
24 Australia 72,405 59 Canada 29,132 94 Paraguay 0
25 Jordan 70,423 60 Tanzania 24,993 95 Peru 0
26 Slovenia 66,387 61 Montenegro 23,899 96 Portugal 0
27 Latvia 66,114 62 Germany 23,235 97 Puerto Rico 0
28 Slovak Republic 66,108 63 Hungary 22,352 98 Russian Federation 0
29 Mauritius 65,144 64 Israel 21,293 99 Spain 0
30 Tunisia 61,551 65 Estonia 21,244 100 Sweden 0
31 Ghana 61,411 66 Namibia 20,715 101 Taiwan 0
32 Georgia 60,120 67 Cyprus 20,713 102 Turkey 0
33 Zimbabwe 60,000 68 Uganda 19,328 103 Uruguay 0
34 Lithuania 59,592 69 Finland 11,286 104 Venezuela 0
35 Botswana 59,532 70 Denmark 8,903 105 Vietnam 0
Notes: Source of data is Asatryan and Todtenhaupt (2016). Thresholds apply to goods (when different thresholds apply)
and are typically set in local currency. Annual average nominal exchange rates are used for conversion to USD.
Table A2: Probit estimates: Determinants of bunchers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Bunching below 5% of threshold Bunching below 10% threshold
Ln Employees -0.028 -0.022 -0.020 -0.009 0.029 -0.022 -0.025* -0.019 -0.018 -0.009 -0.010 -0.018
(0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.033) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.027) (0.017)
Ln Turnover 0.115*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.053*** 0.093*** 0.123*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.100*** 0.073*** 0.096***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009)
Firm age 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Profit tax/Turnover 0.442 1.246* 1.384** 1.046 0.009 1.316** 0.738 1.268** 1.363*** 1.175* 0.716 1.344***
(0.838) (0.662) (0.648) (0.965) (1.262) (0.663) (0.612) (0.503) (0.501) (0.692) (0.800) (0.497)
Deductions/Turnover 0.166 0.075 0.069 0.163 0.191 0.079 0.154* 0.053 0.050 0.090 0.104 0.054
(0.131) (0.075) (0.070) (0.131) (0.173) (0.074) (0.090) (0.036) (0.035) (0.056) (0.077) (0.034)
Buncher dummy (t-1) 0.581*** 0.580*** 0.726*** 0.630*** 0.349** 0.687*** 0.686*** 0.790*** 0.719*** 0.448***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.134) (0.157) (0.151) (0.060) (0.060) (0.077) (0.093) (0.078)
Dummy positive evasion -0.090 -0.063
(0.059) (0.048)
Dummy announced audit (t-1) -0.153** -0.244***
(0.076) (0.060)
Dummy audit (t) 0.009 0.011
(0.072) (0.059)
Industry (base=Trade)
Construction 0.120** 0.111* 0.122** 0.101 0.081 0.111* 0.087* 0.044 0.051 0.058 0.061 0.038
(0.056) (0.063) (0.062) (0.086) (0.105) (0.064) (0.045) (0.050) (0.050) (0.066) (0.080) (0.051)
Finance -0.443*** -0.505*** -0.517*** -0.292 -0.355 -0.513*** -0.528*** -0.575*** -0.584*** -0.487*** -0.557** -0.583***
(0.155) (0.170) (0.171) (0.180) (0.254) (0.172) (0.131) (0.145) (0.146) (0.178) (0.272) (0.150)
IT 0.195** 0.164* 0.156* 0.195 -0.002 0.162* 0.098 0.046 0.041 0.089 0.030 0.047
(0.083) (0.093) (0.093) (0.119) (0.158) (0.094) (0.075) (0.084) (0.084) (0.104) (0.127) (0.084)
Manufacturing 0.155** 0.147** 0.148** 0.183** 0.215** 0.149** 0.102** 0.061 0.061 0.086 0.135* 0.060
(0.063) (0.070) (0.070) (0.090) (0.102) (0.071) (0.051) (0.056) (0.056) (0.070) (0.080) (0.057)
Mining 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.392*** -0.687*** -0.686*** -0.834** -0.679** -0.700***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.133) (0.199) (0.199) (0.332) (0.346) (0.200)
Missing -0.048 -0.004 -0.007 -0.000 -0.068 -0.031 -0.033 -0.023
(0.074) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.056) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082)
Public administration 0.144 -0.004 -0.009 0.194 0.361 -0.016 -0.008 -0.370 -0.374 -0.194 0.020 -0.384
(0.404) (0.371) (0.370) (0.423) (0.457) (0.376) (0.317) (0.373) (0.373) (0.425) (0.459) (0.375)
Services 0.057 0.015 0.010 0.049 0.046 0.018 0.002 -0.048 -0.052 -0.085 -0.025 -0.045
(0.060) (0.066) (0.067) (0.082) (0.100) (0.067) (0.049) (0.054) (0.054) (0.068) (0.080) (0.055)
Transport -0.020 -0.083 -0.090 -0.126 -0.055 -0.087 -0.008 -0.146 -0.150 -0.151 -0.115 -0.147
(0.104) (0.127) (0.127) (0.163) (0.184) (0.129) (0.088) (0.109) (0.109) (0.127) (0.148) (0.110)
Utilities 0.070 0.100 0.097 0.066 0.032 0.102 0.011 -0.034 -0.037 -0.083 -0.060 -0.027
(0.071) (0.076) (0.076) (0.099) (0.121) (0.077) (0.059) (0.064) (0.064) (0.086) (0.100) (0.066)
Legal Inc. (base=CJSC)
Community Enterprise 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.112 -0.190 -0.196 0.202 0.339 -0.192
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.267) (0.372) (0.372) (0.438) (0.455) (0.373)
Foundation 0.321* 0.159 0.152 0.214 0.051 0.161 0.255 0.204 0.199 0.220 0.026 0.224
(0.183) (0.199) (0.199) (0.283) (0.398) (0.204) (0.158) (0.166) (0.166) (0.258) (0.303) (0.170)
LLC 0.092 0.042 0.045 0.155* 0.131 0.045 0.076 0.010 0.012 0.046 0.031 0.025
(0.059) (0.065) (0.065) (0.092) (0.108) (0.066) (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.072) (0.084) (0.053)
NGO -0.164 0.012 0.009 0.463 0.542 0.011 0.104 0.032 0.028 0.174 0.272 0.057
(0.349) (0.377) (0.378) (0.450) (0.462) (0.379) (0.211) (0.299) (0.300) (0.445) (0.452) (0.301)
OJSC -0.013 0.028 0.032 0.226 0.148 0.026 -0.029 -0.038 -0.035 0.107 0.019 -0.030
(0.110) (0.116) (0.116) (0.164) (0.199) (0.118) (0.095) (0.099) (0.099) (0.136) (0.160) (0.101)
Other 0.294 0.320 0.318 0.712*** 0.839*** 0.316 0.075 0.018 0.016 0.397 0.542** 0.018
(0.219) (0.208) (0.209) (0.259) (0.283) (0.210) (0.200) (0.207) (0.207) (0.255) (0.275) (0.209)
State Enterprise 0.039 -0.079 -0.085 0.140 0.035 -0.072 0.104 0.028 0.025 0.170 0.205 0.051
(0.121) (0.142) (0.141) (0.194) (0.234) (0.145) (0.103) (0.114) (0.114) (0.163) (0.185) (0.117)
Trade Cooperative 0.218 0.243* 0.249* 0.418** 0.314 0.251* 0.204* 0.202* 0.205* 0.332** 0.265 0.221*
(0.141) (0.143) (0.142) (0.188) (0.228) (0.148) (0.112) (0.119) (0.119) (0.154) (0.174) (0.123)
Observations 42,669 28,187 28,187 14,310 9,974 28,187 45,846 30,965 30,965 14,669 10,207 30,965
Wald Chi2 1382 638.1 639.7 419.9 281.2 806.5 1387 748.7 746.2 554.4 355.5 855.9
Pseudo-R2 0.0298 0.0286 0.0291 0.0427 0.0384 . 0.0395 0.0514 0.0517 0.0514 0.0400 .
Firms 9,702 10,219
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table presents probit (columns 1-5 and 7-11) and population-averaged probit (columns 6 and 12) estimates of the determinants of
bunching firms. Dummy for bunching firms is defined to be 1 if firm size is below 5% and 10% of the administrative threshold in columns
1-6 and 7-12 respectively, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include year and region (“Marz”) fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are
clustered at the level of firms.
